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Preface 
In our collaborative multidisciplinary research program "status passages and risks in the fife 
course" the project B6 (Household Dynamics and Social Inequality - An International Compari-
son) analyses the relationship between houshold dynamics and status passages in the life course 
of household members. The focus is on changes in the individual members' life courses as condi-
tions and consequences of household transitions. The transition of in te rest in this study is marria-
ge. 
In this paper, spouse selection in the life course of single German men and women is recon-
structed step by step and marriage behavior of aseries of birth cohorts in the last 50 years i8 
compared. The study primarily concerns the way in which young men and women pool their 
educational resources at their first marriage. It becomes apparent that in the course of educa-
tional expansion in West Germany the educational system constitutes an increasingly important 
marriage market. From birth cohort to birth cohort intragenerational educational assortative 
mating has considerably increased, strongly indicating that social structure and social circles 
have become more exclusive rather than inclusive in the process of modernization. 
Prof Dr. Walter R. Heinz 
Chair, Special Collaborative Programme No. 186 
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The Educational System as a Marriage Market 
1. Introduction 
The answer to the question "Who marries whom?" is central to understanding the reproduction 
of socia! inequality in society (Mare 1991). Homogamy and heterogamy rates ref1ect the degree 
to which individuals of different social origin and with various characteristics, such as education, 
religion or occupation, marry each other . Moreover, they indicate the degree of social closure 01' 
social structures and social circles (Simmel 1970; von Wiese 1967). 
Unfortunately nl0st of the available studies have been based on ex post facto analysis of already 
married couples l (Jürgens 1973; Mayer 1977; Tegtmeyer 1979; Galler 1979; Haller 1983; Ziegler 
1985; Hand11988; Teckenberg 1991; UlteelLuijkx 1990; Jones 1991; Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991; 
EriksonJGoldthorpe 1992; Uunk/Ganze-boomIRobert 1992; Uunk 1996; Wirth 1996). This means 
that such studies start from existing marriages and attempt to retrospectively reconstruct and 
thereby explain patterns of marriage behavior on the basis of the individual social characteristics 
of both spouses (such as their social origin, education or occupation). The problems of such a 
methodological approach are obvious. It not only starts from the outcome (the later matches of 
partners) and analyzes the (earlier) social conditions for these matches, but also exc1udes systelna-
tically those who are still single at the time of the interview.2 A more logical procedure would 
begin with the social conditions preceding partner selection and then continuing through the li fe 
course to reconstruct the resulting patterns of marriage (Blossfeld 1996; Blossfeld/Müller 1997). 
The aim of this study is therefore to reconstruct step by step the process of spouse selection in the 
life course of single men and women and to compare the marriage patterns of successive birth 
cohorts in the last 50 years. Of central interest is the more specific question on ways that young 
men and women pool their educational resources at their first marriage. The spouse's level of 
education is thereby considered a main characteristic of social inequality: it not only determines 
each of the individual's labor market, income and career chances within marriage but also the 
cultural resources of the family. Educational homogamy thus implies that the existence of social 
inequality in an individual's life course can be further increased, since the good or bad sociocul-
tural and economic resources corresponding to higher and lower levels of education of men and 
women are cumulated at marriage (Mayer 1977). Should educational homogamy increase in the 
course of history, this not only leads to reinforcement of sodal inequality between married 
This is also true for consensual unions, see Frenzel 1995, for example. 
2 See Ziegler (1985). 
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couples from one cohort to the next, but also to a growing differentiation of social chances of 
each following generation of children. 
The most important result of completed studies on assortative mating thus far is the strong corre-
lation between characteristics of both spouses, like social origin and level of education. This 
suggests that there are mechanisms in modern society which determine intergenerational re-
production of social inequality and influence intragenerational spouse selection. The decisive 
question is how social inequality is reproduced by the manifold individual choices regarding 
spouse selection in the life course. Since today men and women are not forced to marry a particu-
lar person, a more plausible explanation of spouse selection has to rely, on the one hand, on the 
dynamic interplay of opportunity structures and marriage markets and, on the other, on indivi-
dual preferences, inclinations and strategies (Blossfeld 1996; BlossfeldIMüller 1997). In particu-
lar, one should investigate how the mechanisms responsible for influencing isolated individual 
marriage decisions at the microlevellead to a far-reaching reproduction of social inequality at 
the macrolevel and, conversely, why a not insignificant number of men and women still succeed 
in escaping the forces of social reproduction and marry a person who does not have the same 
social origin or educational background. 
In this study processes in educational achievement and marriage behavior of single men and 
women - from the family of origin through the diverse hierarchical stages of their educational 
tracks up to the point of first marriage - are reconstructed from a longitudinal perspecti ve on the 
basis of retrospectively gathered biographies of the German socio-economic panel data (SOEP: 
"Sozio-ökonomisches Panel"). To our knowledge, this is the first study of educational assortative 
mating in which the analysis is not done ex post facto, starting with existing marriages; but 
proceeds step by step ex ante and examines the process of spouse selection in the li fe course (see 
also BlossfeldlMüller 1997).3 
3 This is of methodological importance since the age-specific rate to marry and the respective highest level of 
education accomplished in the Iife course are interdependent (see also Galler 1979; Ziegler 1985). 
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2. Changes in educational homogamy from generation to generation 
In recent public and sociological discussion it is c1aimed much too quickly that structures of 
social inequality are losing importance and that social positions have rapidly become indivi-
dualized. The theoretical foundation of such an assessment are generally based on pure macro-
analyses, such as those represented by modernization (cf. Treiman 1970; BlaulDuncan 1967; Bell 
1975; Parsons 1971), industrialization (Kerr 1983) or individualization (Beck 1986; Hradil1987) 
theories, all of which are thoroughly teleological and historically descriptive in character (cf. 
Goldthorpe 1996). From a presumed inherent developmentallogic in processes of industrializa-
tion and social modernization, which normally largely remains obscure (cf. Mayer/Blossfeld 
1990), a trend towards openness, meritocratization or individualization in society is inferred. As 
a consequence, of course, rates of educational homogamy should have clearly decreased in the 
course of history. 
Let us therefore first turn to describing the social phenomenon "educational homogamy" and how 
educational assortative mating has changed through history before we approach the reconstruction 
of processes of spouse selection in the life course. This is also necessary in view of the current 
empiricalfindings which are considerably contradictory. Ziegler's (1985), and Ultee and Luijkx's 
(1990) findings, for instance, indicate a decreasing tendency of educational homogamy in modern 
societies. Teckenberg (1991) and Wirth (1996) have in contrast found a largely constant structure 
ofpatterns ofmarriage based on educational attainment. And finally, Mare's (1991) and Kalmijn's 
(1991) study show evidence of a slight increase in educational homogamy. How can these empiri-
cal findings be explained? And which tendencies capture West Germany's developments in the 
last 50 years? 
Besides the differences in the historical periods of observation and further national pecularities 
one of the decisive reasons for the contradictory diagnosis is the use of varying educational 
c1assification schemes. In most studies of homogamy usually the available educational c1assifica-
tion schemes are used - in most cases without asound theoretical basis - to analyse the process 
of change in marriage behavior. Often the nlaxim in those studies is the following: the more 
differentiated the educational classification included in the calculations is, the better one can 
analyze processes of homogamy. Lacking in this argumentation is that the social consequences 
of different educational certificates are not sufficiently taken into account. This way, multiple 
differences in marriage patterns are made evident which are of less social consequence. It seems 
to be reasonable to ask whether the marriage of a woman with intermediate schooling without 
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vocational training and a man with lower secondary schooling without vocational training should 
be classified as sociologically heterogamous due to the differences in educational attainment. Or 
is it sensible to maintain that this marriage is homogamous because the educational certificates 
ofboth spouses provide very similar individual consequences for life chances in terms of social 
inequality and social opportunities (see Blossfeld 1985, 1989). 
In this paper we follow a new strategy in sharp contrast to conventional studies of educational 
homogamy. The emphasis here is not so much on the various titles of educational qualifications 
but rather on the differences in individual opportunities connected with various levels of qualifi-
cation. Therefore, a homogamous marriage is defined as a union between spouses who have 
attained through completion of vocational educational certificates similar social opportunities. 
Such marriages can in this way represent a cumulation of individual advantages or disadvantages 
that individuals have accumulated over their life course. Characteristic for a heterogamous 
marriage is that the advantages and disadvantages accumulated over the individuallife courses 
are to some extent offset. Our hypothesis is that the institutions of the educational system structu-
re the social networks of individuals over time. Individuals are not conscious of the fact that these 
institutions determine the probabilities to meet potential spouses with similar social characteri-
stics. Therefore, the system has a direct and an indirect impact on the Inarriage market of indivi-
duals. 
In this analysis we chose a classification scheme of educational attainment which adequately 
represents educational attainment levels which have real implications for social opportunities. 
Based on several earlier empirical studies on occupational mobility (see e.g. Blossfeld 1985), 
income (see e.g. Hannan, Schömann and Blossfeld 1990, 1995) and career opportunities (see e.g. 
Blossfeld and Mayer 1988; Blossfeld 1989) we decided to use an educational scheme with four 
hierarchicallevels: (1) lower secondary (Hauptschule) and intermediate schooling without voca-
tional training (Mittlere Reife), (2) lower secondary (Hauptschule) and intermediate schooling 
(Mittlere Reife) with vocational training or higher secondary schooling (Abitur) without and with 
vocational training, (3) specialized technical college degree (Fachhochschulabschluß), and (4) 
university degree. This classification of educationallevels does not only correspond to a large 
ex te nt to the four career segments in the public service sector in West Germany (ordinary, inter-
mediate, higher intermediate and higher service positions) (Blossfeld 1985; Becker 1993); it also 
reflects global entry, career and income opportunities of employees in the private sector (Bloss-
feld 1985, 1989; Becker 1993; Hannan, Schömann, Blossfeld 1990). The designations "higher", 
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"lower" and "equal" thus have a c1ear social meaning in our study of assortative mating (see also 
Blossfeld 1985, 1989; Becker 1993). 
Some consequences of variations in this educational c1assification scheme on the observed trends 
of homogamy are shown in the appendix. Column 1 of this table reflects the c1assification used 
in this paper and is equivalent to the figures in Table 1. In Column 2 we differentiate in addition 
between lower secondary schooling (Hauptschule) without vocational training and intermediate 
schooling (Mittlere Reife) without vocational training. The results are altnost identical to Column 
1. In Column 3 we differentiate furthermore the graduates of higher secondary schooling (Abitur) 
without and with vocational training from those who completed lower secondary schooling with 
vocational training or intermediate schooling with vocational training. The basic trend towards 
more homogamy across cohorts that is shown in Columns 1 and 2 is found again in Column 3. 
The rates of homogamy in Column 3 differ to Columns 1 and 2 by about 5 to 10 percent. Finally, 
we differentiate between lower secondary schooling with vocational training, on the one hand, 
and intermediate school qualifications (Mittlere Reife) with vocational training and higher 
secondary school qualification (Abitur) with and without vocational training, on the other. In 
Column 4 you can see the danger of relying too much on educational tides per se in an analysis 
of educational homogamy. In this column the trend towards rising homogamy (as observed in 
Columns 1,2 and 3) is superimposed and concealed. In Column 4 the homogamy trend seems to 
be non-monotonic. At first educational homogamy rises and after cohort 1944-48 falls again. How 
can we explain this non-monotonic trend? There is a simple explanation. Using this educational 
classification the typical marriage of a woman with intermediate schooling and commercial 
vocational training to a man with lower secondary schooling) and industrial vocational training 
(which make up about 35 percent ofmarriages for women with intermediate schooling4) is treated 
as heterogamous. Moreover, in this case the wife (due to her completion of intermediate schoo-
ling) would be regarded as having married downwards and the husband (due to his lower secon-
dary school certificate) would be c1assified as having married upwards. However, this does not 
reflect their labour market, income and career opportunities (see Blossfeld 1985, 1989). Much 
rather, these two individuals have very similar gender-specific and socio-economic resources 
connected with their educational attainment (see Blossfeld 1985, 1989). In the course of the 
democratization of education, women have for many years been more able to attain intermediate 
school qualifications with vocational training; men at the same time have more often completed 
4 Only 26 percent of wornen with intermediate schooling with vocational training rnarry a man with intermediate 
schooling with vocational training. This means that the majority of wornen with intermediate schooling and vocational 
training rnarry rnen with lower secondary schooling with vocational training. 
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lower secondary school qualifications with vocational training. Consequently, an increase and 
then a decrease in homogamous marriages can be observed (see Blossfeldffimm 1997). Based 
on these observations, we decided to use the classification with only four hierarchically ranked 
levels of educational attainment. 
Table 1 shows the trends in marrying upwards, marrying downwards and homogamous maniages 
of wives and husbands, each according to birth cohort. This table also contains estimations of the 
predicted development of patterns of marriage under conditions of statistical independence. This 
means that the predicted values reflect the tendency to many assortatively, given a random 
selection of spouses and the distribution of educational attainment level of women and men, 
respectively, in each birth cohort. 
Foul' results of the empirical developments in Table 1 are especially notable. At first, if we 
exclude the cohorts at the opposite ends born between 1900-1918 and 1964-1978 (as each of theIn 
suffers from specific selectivities which are difficult to interpret) going from the older to the 
younger cohorts, one can observe a strong and almost continuous rise from approximately 44(1'0 
to over 70% in the proportion of homogamous maniages. The differences in the percentages for 
husbands and wives in the different cohorts can be attributed to age differences between spouses, 
meaning that men and women partially belonged to different birth cohorts (see also Klein 1996). 
Secondly, in Table 1 it is also evident that the proportion of upward marrying women - and the 
minoring trend of downward marrying men - is surprisingly high. This indicates that in West 
Germany, as in most industrialized countries (McRae 1986), there were social norms at work 
orienting women (especially among the older cohorts )less towards acquiring their own education 
and instead towards placing more value in manying men who have higher qualifications or at 
least similar levels of education. These norms are part of a traditional notion that husbands and 
not wives are responsible for lifelong gainful employment. We will discuss this point in greater 
detail below. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Upward, Downward and Homogamous Marriages With Regard to 
Educational Attainment Level for Birth Cohorts (partner' s highest educational 
attainment level at time of marriage) 
Cohorts Upward Marr'iage Homogamous Marriage Downward Marr'iage 
Observed Estimated Observed Estimated Observed Estimated 
Based on the Based on the Based on the 
Independence Independence Independence 
Model Model Model 
% % % % % % % 
Wives 
(1900- 1918) 48.4 50.6 50.3 40.2 1.3 9.1 100 
1919 - 1923 52.1 53.9 43.9 38.7 4.0 7.4 100 
1924 - 1928 46.7 50.0 49.3 41.6 4.0 8.8 100 
1929 - 1933 54.4 51.3 40.8 37.8 4.8 11.0 100 
1934 - 1938 37.8 42.1 56.0 47.1 6.2 10.8 100 
1939 - 1943 36.9 39.5 58.1 50.6 5.0 9.9 100 
1944 - 1948 26.7 33.4 65.5 52.6 7.8 13.9 100 
1949-1953 27.0 33.4 68.8 52.5 4.2 14.1 100 
1954 - 1958 23.9 27.1 70.6 55.0 5.5 17.7 100 
1959 - 1963 21.6 24.5 70.0 58.4 8.4 16.7 100 
(1964-1978) 22.3 28.3 69.9 49.2 7.8 22.7 100 
Total 100 
Husbands 
(1900--1918) 1.9 9.1 51.7 40.2 46.5 50.6 100 
1919 - 1923 5.8 7.4 44.8 38.7 49.4 53.9 100 
1924 - 1928 4.6 8.8 42.5 41.6 52.9 50.0 100 
1929-1933 5.9 11.0 45.6 37.8 48.5 51.3 100 
1934 - 1938 5.8 10.8 57.5 47.1 36.7 42.1 100 
1939 - 1943 5.1 9.9 61.6 50.6 33.3 39.5 100 
1944 - 1948 5.4 13.9 66.8 52.6 27.8 33.4 100 
1949 - 1953 6.3 14.1 70.7 52.5 23.0 33.4 100 
1954 - 1958 3.8 17.7 73.7 55.0 22.5 27.1 100 
1959 - 1963 7.7 16.7 71.5 58.4 20.8 24.5 100 
(1964- 1978) 13.4 22.7 65.2 49.2 21.3 28.3 100 
Total 100 
Source: Socio-Economic Panel, Waves 1984-94 
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Thirdly, from cohort to cohort there is evidence that traditional marriages are becoming less 
important: whereas it was quite normal that women born before 1933 were in tradition al marria-
ges (approximately 54%), the percentage of women in traditional marriages in the cohort born 
between 1959 -1963 fell to approximately 21 %. The tradition al pattern of marriage is nonetheless 
still relatively widespread with one-fifth of the married couples among the younger cohorts. 
Finally and fourthly, there has always been a small percentile of women and men who have 
deviatedfrom traditional norms pertaining to marriage. These women have married less quali-
fied men; or conversely, the men have married nlore highly qualified women. Interestingly this 
proportion has remained relatively stable across cohorts, fluctuating at levels between 4% and 
8%; none of the cohorts show a specific trend. This is particularly astonishing if we take into 
account that women have in comparison to men profited much more from the expansion of 
educational opportunities (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). From a purely statistical view, the proba-
bility of marrying a higher qualified women should have continuously increased for each younger 
cohort of men. 
This is dear when comparing the observed distribution with the predicted "random" distribution 
of spouse selection (according to educational attainment) for men and for woinen of a respective 
cohort and given distribution of educational attainment. The expected values for example of the 
female cohort born between 1954-1958 who should have married downwards is 17.7%; the 
observed value was however in fact only 5.5%. For those born between 1924-1928 the difference 
between the observed and predicted values were in contrast only 4.8 percentage points (8.8% and 
4.0% respectively). 
Across cohorts the comparison of the observed with the predicted values shows two additionally 
interesting findings (see Table 1). For one, empirical evidence shows that educational homogamy 
has always been "above chance" and this tendency has been further reinforced by the expansion 
of education across cohorts. Secondly, the observed tendency for women to marry upward has 
always been dose to the predicted values of the "random" model. In other words, this means that, 
given the gender-specific distribution of educational attainments, there has been a "structural 
need" for women to marry higher educated men. 
The theoretical and empirical challenges are now to reconstruct how the pattern of educational 
homogamy as an aggregate of many individual decisions in the life course has developed and to 
explain why this has moreover been reinforced across generations. 
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3. Theories and hypotheses 
This study is based on the theoretical position that every sociological analysis requires adynamie 
integration of a macro- and microperspectives (cf. Blossfeld 1996; BlossfeldlMüller 1997). In 
particular, it builds on the following five main premises. 
Five general explanatory premises or why "non-rational" factors on marriage decisions are 
of secondary importance from a sociological view: 
First, it is assumed that patterns of social regularities, such as in "educational homogmny", must 
be theoretically explained at the level of the individual actors ("principle of methodological 
individualism"; see, e.g., Lindenberg 1996). But individuals should not be considered statically: 
i.e. not only at the point in time of marriage or the interview (Blossfeld 1996). Rather, it is impor-
tant to reconstruct step by step in the life course the se ries of actions which are relevant for the 
marriage event (cf., e.g., Mayerffuma 1985; Mayer 1990). It is important here to reconstruct the 
time-related structural action contexts of marriage decisions (Blau 1994) that reduce the infinite 
possibilities to act to a concrete number of action alternatives (vgl. Elster 1979). 
Secondly, it is necessary to specify a mechanism that singles out an action from among the 
available structurally determined alternatives. Since individuals choose marriage partners, this 
mechanism must be based on orientations, expectations and convictions of individuals.5 
Thirdly, the ''free will" of individuals has to be taken into account.6 This introduces an essential 
element of indeterminancy into causal inferences in theoretical explanations and predictions. 
This means that the generality but not the determinancy of marriage decisions can only be 
5 Even in the case of traditional and habitual behavior, the actors can at all times be conscious about the subjective 
meaning of their actions. 
6 "Free will" is just as difficult to define as the term "chance". Wh at is meant with these two terms is that it is either 
impossible or at least senseless to trace all possible determining factors. Modern-day atom physics generally accepts 
today that certain processes must be considered indeterminable. In quantum physics, as opposed to c1assical macro-
physics, astate is not described by its observed values but by the probability of possible values (Scheid 1996). 
Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) have argued strongly that sociologists should take the "free will" of ac tors more 
seriously into account and should strictly avoid using deterministic in favor of probabilistic explanations of human 
action: i.e. in theoretical and empirical work not to use models with the characteristics (values) of actions, but rather 
the probability of the change in actions. 
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plausibly accounted for and modelled. A sociologist should therefore only refer to the common 
motivations of many actors and not the idiosyncratic motivations of individuals. In this sense, 
Max Weber refered to the average or near (i.e. "idealtypical") reconstruction ofthe context of 
meaning and motives of actors. 
If spouse selection of a larger number of actors is explained, the "weak" model of rational choice 
has a privileged role. This is not only because the average woman and man try to act reasonably 
but because the predictability of the behavior of aggregates can be done most successfully if we 
assume that individual ac tors act more or less rationally (Elster 1989a; Stinchcombe 1968). This 
"weak" model assumes that human action is goal-oriented, that there are different nleans available 
to the actors to achieve these ends, and that they tend to base their decisions on selecting the best 
alternative after weighing and comparing the probable costs and benefits of each combination of 
means and ends (Weber 1972). 
However, it is most often not possible to make "rational" choices with respect to a future spouse. 
Individuals are often faced by at least the following three concrete decision problems: (1) possible 
future marriage partners are still unknown; (2) it is impossible to evaluate long-term costs and 
bene.fits of known alternatives; and (3) the marginal advantages andlor disadvantages resulting 
from collecting further information about the possible partner search are unclear. In short, the 
decision situation is more or less indeterminate, making it close to impossible to make a rational 
(or calculated) decision. Individuals therefore normally need another mechanism to be able to 
make marriage decisions. These consist, according to Heiner (1983), in the orientation towards 
social norms which assist individuals in undefined, current decision situations. The orientation 
towards social norms allows individuals not only to act in a manner understandable to others but 
to understand others' actions and predict how others will most probably behave. According to 
Heiner (1983) it is for this reason that, paradoxi-cally, individual actions are ever Inore under-
standable and predictable the more undefined and the more impossible it is to evaluate the 
decision-making situation, since social rules of behavior will be even more restrictive. Sodal 
norms have thus an important function in the explanation of marital dedsions. Of theoretical 
importance here is the presupposition of a reflected or, in principle, potentially reflective use of 
social rules. The main function that norms take on in the decision-making process has been 
elaborated by Elster (1989b): it is in the coordination of expectations of the involved actors. 
Norms have a coordinating function in that they appeal strongly to the emotions (to such feelings 
as shame, embarrassment, fear, guilt or awkwardness) of the ac tors and the other involved per-
sons. 
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Critics of this type of rational choice model argue that there are several "non-rational" factors 
influencing the choice of a spouse which are necessarily neglected with such a "narrow" per-
spective. This is correct. Such models abstract from the individual case which might be very 
important for an explanation of why a particular individual chooses a certain spouse. These 
factors are however usually of little value in explaining social differences in the process of 
educational homogamy or changes in this process, since these differences normally do not vary 
systematically across groups with different levels of educational attainment or over time. For 
example, "beauty" and "sexuality" are important factors in spouse selection. As long as one 
cannot however claim that this is true for one group more than for another or as long as these 
factors do not increase or decrease in importance in regard to educational homogamy, this sort 
of additional information is not particularly useful for predicting spouse selection of groups, even 
if such characteristics could be measured properly (cf. Oppenheimer 1988). Moreover, the fact 
that individuals tend to have strong affection for potential partners does not change the point that 
individual decision-making is not responsive to objective structural conditions. Realities are very 
often expressed through emotions and do not seI dom affect individuals in considering a certain 
person as a potential partner (Oppenheimer 1988). 
Educational system and educational homogamy 
The model of spouse selection developed above depicts marriage decisions as the result of a long-
term, cumulative and continuously changing life course process (Haller 1982). From a social 
structural point of view, this process begins with socialization in childhood and youth in the 
family of origin, which can be specified above all through different economic and cultural con-
texts, and branches off in the educational system and into different occupational careers. This 
process is connected with a continuous restructuring of sodal networks and interaction relations-
hips in the occupational and private spheres (Laumann 1973) which makes for a constant change 
in the chances of meeting certain potential spouses in everyday activities. 
Decisions about partners and spouse selection are most often made in the phase of transition from 
youth to adulthood. The process of transition can not be described by rigid age categories but 
much rather through the gradual adoption of specific social roles and differential participation in 
certain activities (Hogan 1978; Marini 1984; BlossfeldINuthmann 1989). The decision to marry 
is itself a defining characteristic of the normative conception of the transition into adulthood 
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(FeathermanJHogan/Sorensen 1984). The other significant transitions (e.g. completion of educa-
tion, entry into occupationallife and a career) are determined by the educational system and the 
employment system. In the following the focus is on the role of the educational system with 
respect to spouse selection in the life course. 
The hierarchical organization of the educational system above all promotes among youth and 
young adults a relatively rigid life course logic: the educational process is organized by a step by 
step sequence of hurdles that have to be mastered by each generation. Points of transition in 
educational biographies can not be arbitrarily chosen, revised or postponed and if so only with 
difficulty (cf. Blossfeld 1989, 1990). Every educational hurdle is faced by a percentage ofyoung 
adults that masters each hurdle while another percentage fails to succeed in the process of acqui-
ring higher qualifications. The probability of successfully completing a particular educational 
attainment level depends, on the one hand, on places available in different forms of schooling for 
each generation and, on the other, on the social mechanisms of allocation, such as discrimination 
according to gender or social origin (cf. Mare 1981; Shavit/Blossfeld 1993). 
From a life course perspective the gradual process of selection in the educational system has 
chiefly three important consequences for educational homogamy. First of all, the selectivity in 
the educational system has created increasingly homogeneous groups, since in each generation 
the less qualified are leaving the educational system. From one step in the selection pröcess to the 
next, only those youth or young adults remain together longer who attain either the same or a 
higher educationallevel. If one accepts Blau's (1994) assumption that the probability of develo-
ping friendships is dependent on contact opportunities, then there is a structurally determined 
increased likelihood of establishing a social relationship with a similarly qualified partner - and 
then perhaps of later marrying him/her - due to the mere fact that one has continued in the 
educational system. It is important to note that we mean not only the contacts that one makes 
directly within educational institutions but those within a broader circle of contacts: friends and 
friends of friends, opportunities for contact in free-time activities and the like which are structur-
ed directly or indirectly by the educational system. Conversely, the structural chance of meeting 
a partner with a different level of educational attainment decreases significantly with time in 
school because (1) those in the respective age group with lower qualifications have left the 
educational system in the life course and have thereby taken "other trajectories" (with different 
social networks); (2) the "ceiling effects" or chances of meeting a partner with higher qualifica-
tions clearly decreases as the level of educational attainment advances. Thus, the growing possibi-
lity of meeting people with the same level of qualification is more frequently a by-product of the 
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selection process in the educational system which in turn indirectly increases the likelihood of 
educational homogamy. 
Secondly, the process of selection in education means that the more highly qual(fied willleave 
the educational system at a later age. Since attaining an education makes it difficult to participate 
in activities pertaining to family roles (Marini 1985) and attending school, the university7 or 
vocational training programs involves a high degree of financial dependency on parents or the 
state (BlossfeldINuthmann 1989), many men and women who are still completing their education 
are "not prepared" to start a family. Completion of education is thus also an important step in the 
normative conception of the transition to adulthood and in this way it becomes a significant 
prerequisite for entering marriage (Blossfeld/Huinink 1989; Blossfeld/Jaenichen 1990). Since 
the more highly qualified will postpone starting afamily, the probability grows that they will then 
quickly "catch up" with their age cohort and marry the partner who became afriend during the 
period of education. The consequence will therefore be that there is a rising strong tendency to 
marry persons of the same educational attainment level not only directly after leaving the educa-
tional system, but also because of the aforementioned processes of selection involving education-
related contact chances which should considerably rise as the level of educa tion of the young men 
and women rises. 
Thirdly, in this educational selection process the less qualified enter the labor market and em-
ployment at an earlier age. This transition is often connected with a more heterogeneous social 
network, which implies an increase in the frequency of contacts to people with different social 
characteristics, such as age, occupation, educational attainment, etc. The chances of meeting a 
spouse with a different level of education is thus structurally increased. Many of these contacts 
will occur by chance and be unimportant. But without the chance to meet people no new social 
relationships can develop. Not seldom do life-long friendships and marriages begin with such 
"coincidental" encounters (Blau 1994). This group of less qualified people is not only prepared 
to marry at an earlier age but this (conscious or latent) state of "readiness" meets up with a much 
more heterogeneous marriage market. In this sense a lower level of educational attainment is 
related to an earlier and higher likelihood of heterogamy in the life course. On the other hand, 
lower skilIed young adults who have Jett the educational system earlier in the life course will for 
a long time at the workplace tend to meet other people in their age group with similar educational 
attainment. Furthermore, if the assumption is true that individuals tend to prefer spouses of 
7 The flexibility of time schedule at a university is perhaps an exception. 
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approximately the same age, this should reinforce the tendency of homogamous marriage among 
the less qualified. Having left the educational system earlier, however, the decision to marry nlay 
tend to be made at later points in the life course among lower qualified people. HOlnogarny 
among the lower qualified is therefore characterized less by age. 
In summary, the respective opportunities to meet a potential spouse in the life course of men and 
women should be very different with regard to educational attainment and highly time-dependent 
because they are based on the logic of a hierarchically structured educational system. The likeli-
hood of educational homogamy should increase significantly with the level of educational attain-
ment. A logical implication of such a life course process is that through educational expansion 
(cf. ShavitlBlossfeld 1993; Müller/Karle 1993; Erikson/Jonsson 1996) the tendency of educa-
tional homogamy should continue to increase across generations, since the level of educational 
attainrnent and the duration of educational participation increases for a growing number of cohort 
members (cf. Blossfeld 1985, 1989). 
Aspects of individual mari tal decisions 
The continuously changing structural opportunities to meet people and find a marriage partner 
in the life course represent however only the necessary conditions for assortative mating (Blau 
1994). The young men and women still have to choose the partner or spouse from within their 
social networks. The explanation of these processes requires an "average" or "idealtypical" model 
of decision making ("ideal types" as constructed by Max Weber, 1972) (cf. Blossfeld 1996; 
Blossfeld/Müller 1997). 
From the view of the individual, the li fe course is connected with a continuous change of identity, 
values, preferences, and expectations (Haller 1982). As a consequence the inclination to choose 
a partner, and perhaps also to marry, according to certain characteristics will repeatedly change 
in the life course. Since one cannot assurne that men and wornen are fully informed about all of 
the potential partners, our search mode18 must be based on the premise that people develop a more 
8 Choosing a partner does not have to be the result of an active search. One can definitely find a partner without 
searching. 
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or less vague and conscious idea of what they consider to be an acceptable marriage partner9 
(Oppenheimer 1988). People who do not satisfy this baseline definition of an acceptable spouse 
are not seriously considered anymore, while those who do fulfill this minimal definition must not 
be "ideal partners". The search will therefore not be continued until a perfect partner has been 
found. The ex te nt to which the real partner corresponds to the notion of an ideal partner as weIl 
as the duration of the search are thus dependent upon the baseline definition, which can of course 
also change in the life course. Moreover, marriage partner decisions, it is important to remember, 
are consensual choices. This means that if a person wants to let a first encounter or repeated 
rendez-vous develop into a long-term intimate relationship or marriage, then this goal can only 
be achieved, ifboth partners agree (Blau 1994). Both partners must therefore have an interest in 
the continuation and stability of the relationship and, if the case may be, of turning it into a 
marriage. Thus, the rationalities of both partners have to be taken into account. 
Along with Blau (1994) it is also assumed here that two individuals begin and maintain a part-
nership, because both expect the relationship to be worthwhile. If the first step into a partnership 
is a successful experience, often a process of self-fulfilling prophecies develops. The exchange 
is of social not economic character (cf. also Blau 1964; Curtis 1986). That is, if a person can 
benefit from a social relationship, it is not implicitly or explicitly stipulated per contract that a 
benefit be rendered in return, though the situation engenders a tempo rally unspecijied, diffuse 
commitment to providefor some sort of benefit in return. Such inclinations to give in return are 
thereby entirely upheld and reinforced by self-interest in the continuation of the social relation-
ship and by social norms, such as "expectations of appreciation". The diffuseness and in principle 
poorly defined mutual comlnitments imply however that an intensive exchange between two 
persons can only ensue if more solid social bonds had previously existed which were based on 
trust. Every couple's main problem consists therefore in the building and establishing of trust. 
Thus becoming a couple involves individual striving for reward, but the decisive benefit is when 
the dose friendship with mutual support and trust has been established - that which constitutes 
the worthwhile partnership experience per se (Blau 1994). Therefore a partnership can not last 
long if its basis of trust is violated anew. Whereby here social norms can also be effective: those 
which socially disapprove of such behavior and promote trust-building behavior. 
9 The criteria do not have to be consciously formulated. It can also be a matter of relatively vague notions of what 
one is looking for in a partner. 
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Elster (1979) suggested that decisions to marry can therefore be interpreted as an important 
method to increase trust in the future of a partnership. By deciding to marry the actors commit 
themselves at present to act responsibly toward their partner in the future. This self-commitrnent 
points to a long-term goal in life which entails the desired future behavior towards onels partner 
which one will most probably follow. As Elster (1979) has remarked, the expected change in the 
prob ability of onels own future behavior is the real motive and not only an unintended consequen-
ce. Such long-term self-commitment creates a greater basis of trust and gives future behavior 
greater credibility, furthering cooperation in the partnership (at least at the beginning). 
Gender-specific mechanisms 
In the following we mainly concentrate on the influence of gender and social origin on the partner 
selection process. Provided that there are no differences in income distributions between men and 
women on the labor market, both men and women should, according to Becker (1981: 73) benefit 
mostly from a partners hip in which each person resembled as much as possible his/her partner 
in terms of all social characteristics (intelligence, health, education, personality, religion, social 
origin, etc.). This implies that the preference and benefit structure of men and women tend to be 
inherently prone to (educational) homogamy, i.e., "the like likes the like"; and there is aseries of 
empirical indicators that suggest that this is in fact true (Blau 1994: 4). 
Modern societies are however characterized by a marked gender-specijic division of labor and 
the ensuing mutual dependency between the sexes. According to Becker (1981) for this reason the 
benefit function of men and women differ considerably. Women and men do not only marry to 
fulfill the need for intimacy or because they want to have children together. They also marry 
because the roles set up by society are complimentary; thus both partners can each reap a greater 
benefit from living together than if they stayed single. In accordance with this traditional gender 
role model, men expect to benefit from their wives, since women have been socialized to be more 
oriented towards taking charge of the household and raising children; women, on the other hand, 
count on benefiting from men since men have specialized themselves in the goal of life-Iong 
gainful employment. A good education is therefore, especially for men, of much importance in 
the traditional family model since the manls income position and the concomitant social status 
of the entire family are thereby determined. Thus, wamen will prefer men with a higher educatian 
and better labor market chances and will compete for them. From a male perspective the impor-
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tance of the educationallevel of women is ambiguous based on the tradition al family model. For 
one, men have the greatest advantage if their partners are as similar as possible in characteristics, 
including the educationallevel. On the other side, traditional men are interested in women who 
have not invested too much in their own career and thus in their market-related education. In 
other words, they prefer women with as similar as possible qualifications but who are less career 
oriented. For men the level of education of a woman carries thus less weight in spouse selection. 
In the traditional gender-role model, men will nevertheless at least try to find equally qual~fied 
partners. Since women in a traditionally oriented society attach less value to the role of their 
formal educations, the average level of education among women remains far below that of the 
men. Only some of the men will therefore succeed in finding a woman with the same respective 
qualifications (see Table 1). Empirical evidence for older birth cohorts has shown that wives often 
have a lower level of education and are often younger than their husbands. Thus, and using this 
action model to explain these data, it is less important for traditional women to have a formal 
higher education than it is for traditional men. Furthermore, it is easier for women at a younger 
age to assess each partner's future important role attributes (housewife versus career or bread-
winner roles) (Oppenheimer 1988). Certainly one can not deny that it is above all those among 
the older cohort in our analysis for whom this tradition al action model played an important role 
(see Table 1). This model is capable of explaining men's tendency towards educational hypoga-
my, and women's towards educational hypergamy. But such action models are also subject to 
social change. 
The probability that young men and women follow intentional tradition al norms in aseries of 
birth cohorts strongly depends on the degree of conformity in each of the preceding generations 
with these norms as weIl as the usefulness of these behavioral norms with regard to the changing 
social environment. The tradition al gender-specific pattern of action in which men prefer women 
who have the same or lower level of qualifications and are younger, will definitely start to become 
weaker should the life-Iong market-based employment not only be reserved for men but also 
increasingly become a central component of wives' conception of life (cf. Bloss-
feld/DrobniclRohwer 1996; BlossfeldlHakim 1997). This change not only causes education to 
be of growing importance in the life of each younger generation of women - with all of the 
aforementioned consequences for the structural chances to meet equally qualified partners. This 
change also shifts the cost-benefit calculation of each younger generation of men and women. 
Oppenheimer (1988) in particular brought attention to the fact that in a society in which the 
continuous gainful employment of wives has become normal, wives' incomes increasingly beco-
me a determinant in the living standard and "lifestyle" of the families (see also EgebeenIHawkins 
1990). Wornen have increasingly taken over apart of the "breadwinner role" in the farnily, 
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previously only reserved for the husbands in the traditional family model. Since the level of 
education is dearly an important factor determining the labor market, career and income chances 
of women, men in each successive younger generation will prefer increasingly higher qual~fied 
women. Men with the highest qualifications will attempt to choose women with the highest 
qualifications (Mare 1991). Men with lower qualifications will also prefer wornen with lügher 
qualifications, but since their competitive chances are at a relative disadvantage they will only 
tend to be able to choose among women with worse labor market, career and income chances. 
The relative improvernent in women's educational attainment compared to that of men (Blossfeld 
1985, 1989; ShavitIBlossfeld 1993) leads from generation to generation to an increase in the 
competition for qualified women. This, together with women's structurally increased chance of 
meeting people of equal qualification in the educational system, should raise the level of educa-
tional homogamy across cohorts and reduce the educational hypergamy of women. This process 
of competition should also explain the interesting findings in Table 1, which shows that the 
proportion of women who marry less qualified men (educational hypogamy among women) has 
not particularly grown across cohorts, although the increase in the level of qualification among 
women was relatively stronger than among men (Blossfeld 1985, 1989; ShavitlBlossfeld 1993). 
Mechanisms of social origin 
Gf importance for our understanding of educational homogamy as a step in the process of re-
production of social inequality is the role of direct and indirect effects of social origin. 
From the theoretical position taken in this paper, it follows that one cannot understand partner and 
marriage decisions to be simply dictated by social dass and the associated socio-cultural milieus 
(i.e. their subcultural norm and value systems) which are carried out unreflected by the actors. 
Rather, it is presupposed that norms specific to social origin are used in a conscious way or can 
at least in principle be reflected on, leaving open the possibility of social change in these norms 
(Elster 1989b). 
With respect to direct influences of social origin one can first of all expect educational homoga-
my to increase with the level of education of the social origin. Social origin entails a highly 
correlated conglomerate of characteristics, such as wealth, income, prestige, education, etc., 
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which in turn positively correlates with the educational attainment of the children. This not only 
makes status differences between groups with different levels of education socially more impor--
tant but also makes the barriers between the social circ1es defined by educationallevels increa-
singly stronger. One can therefore expect the direct effect of sodalorigin on homogamy to be 
stronger the higher the level of education of the parents, since the social networks thereby be-· 
come more exc1usive. 
Studies on educational attainment show that the expansion of education has opened up higher 
education to disadvantaged children in absolute numbers across cohorts but without having 
significantly improved the relative opportunities related to social origin (see also Blossfeld/Shavit 
1993; MülleriKarle 1993; Müller/Haun 1994; Henz/Maas 1995; Erikson/Jonsson 1996). This 
implies that the probability to meet children from more disadvantaged social c1asses falls (rises) 
with the level of education attained. Therefore, one can assurne the followingfour indirect effects 
of sodalorigin on the choice of friends and marriage dedsions: (1) The possibility of associating 
with an equally qualified partner in the educational system is the highest if the level of education 
of the men and women corresponds to that of the family of origin. In this case the social networks 
of the family of origin and the social networks developing within the educational system will 
overlap and mutually reinforce each other. (2) Those men and women who experience upward 
social mobility in educational attainment with respect to their family will establish new social 
relationships. And since these individuals will not only prefer partners with the same education 
but will also work toward securing this new status, the likelihood of educational homogamy will 
also increase. However, these men and women also retain their social origin. That is, they proba-
bly remain in c10se contact with those people dear to them from their social origin (friends, 
acquaintances, relatives, etc.) over a considerable period oftime in their life (Blau 1994). Thus, 
we expect that this will increase the likelihood of finding a partner from his/her social origin and 
to marry downwards. The effect of social origin should - as elaborated above - play an important 
role, particularly for traditionally oriented men. It can furthermore partially explain the low 
proportion of hypogamy of women in Table 1. (3) Conversely, men and women who are 
downward mobile in their educational attainment with respect to their family of origin, will try 
to reach anew the status of their family of origin and they will therefore be less inclined toward 
educational homogamy. They will also have the chance to meet better educated partners through 
their social networks re la ted to their social origin (friends, acquaintances, relatives, etc.) and 
again be more likely to marry upwards. This will especially be the case for traditionally oriented 
women. (4) Finally, in a purely structural sense, the likelihood is very small that men and women, 
who are upwardly (downwardly) mobile due to educational attainment, step up (down) the social 
ladder one step further, so to speak, by marrying further upwards (downwards). Such mobility is 
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difficult due to the lack of social networks established through social origin and/or through the 
educational process. 
In summary, should children from (under)privileged classes succeed (or fail) in the course oftheir 
education to go beyond (or fall below) those educational attainment levels of their social origin, 
then there will be a tendency of downward mobility by marriage which will partially correct the 
individual achievements (or failures). On the other hand, there will also be a certain nUlnber of 
children from the underprivileged classes who will succeed not only through education alone to 
be socially mobile but will also be able to secure this upward climb through educational homoga-
my. These men and women are the real beneficiaries of educational expansion. The percentage 
of these marriages and its change across generations should thus be a good indicator of the degree 
of social closure of intergenerational structures of social inequality. The degree of this openness 
must be examined in an empirical analysis and this will be discussed in the following section. 
Which tendencies do we expect with regard to the expansion of education? Since with respect to 
social origin the relative chances of educational attainment have not significantly changed, the 
relative probability of contacts between different social groups should have also largely remained 
stable. This does not seem very optimistic. However, the absolute number of underprivileged 
children that has managed to attain higher levels of education has risen in the course of educa-
tional expansion. This means that their chances of meeting children from lzigher social classes 
has increased. This should diminish the social barriers between children from different social 
classes and increase the probability of coupling among these children. Thus, the direct effect of 
social origin on educational hypergamy should decrease from cohort to cohort. The following 
empirical examination will show which of these partially opposing tendencies has been dominant. 
4. Data, methods and variables 
In the following we attempt to empirically evaluate the hypotheses formulated above on the 
relationship between social origin, educational career, and decision-making related to marriage. 
This study is carried out on the basis of the German Socio-Economic Panel (Sozio-ökonomischen 
Panels - SOEP). There is an ample number of descriptions available on SOEP data (cf. e.g. Krupp 
1985; Hanefeld 1987; Rendtel 1988, 1989) which makes it unnecessary at this point to provide 
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more detailed information on this data set. The data allow us to reconstruct step by step the 
educational careers and the processes of entry into the first marriage in the li fe course of single 
men and women. For this purpose the retrospectively gathered biographical SOEP data has been 
used which have been updated by prospectively gathered data in the course of 11 panel waves 
(1984 - 1994). Since the aim is to obtain a long-term description ofthe changes in the nlarriage 
process, the analysis has been limited to German men and women in West Germany. 
It is possible to model the interdependencies of the relationship between educational career and 
the marriage process with causal-type transition rate models (see BlossfeldIRohwer 1995, 1996). 
Either of these processes can be specified as the dependent, the other then as the independent 
process. This is done with the help of time-dependent covariates in the model. The model has 
been conceptualized in the following way: 
At any point in time, t, after age 15 (10 = 0) in the life course of single men and women we exami-
ne how the change in educational attainment in the respective past (i.e. before t) lead to a change 
in the transition rate of marriage (ßr(t')) in the present and the future. This modelling requires that 
we take the temporal order in which these processes evolve very seriously. 
In our analysis the transition rate of marriage or the inclination to marry is the dependent variable: 
(2) r(t) = lim P(t::; T< tflT ~ t) 
t'-t tf-t 
whereby P(.) is the probability that a man or a woman marries in the time interval [t,1'], at age t, 
given that he/she is still single at t, that is, in the interval from 0 to t (see Bloss-
feld/HamerlelMayer 1989; BlossfeldIRohwer 1995). The observation of the marriage process 
begins for each individual at the age of 15 and ends at the event of the first marriage, at the age 
of 60 (right censored), or the last panel interview in 1994 (right censored). 
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To model the marriage rate, we use an exponential model with time-constant (Xl) and tin1e-
dependent (X/t)) covariates with three destination states (competing risks; see BlossfeldIRohwer 
1995): 
This means that the individuals are at first single (origin state) and at time of marriage they can 
make a transition into three destination states: (1) husband's/wife's educational attainment is 
higher than that of the wife's/husband's at the time of marriage (upward marriage: k = 1); (2) 
husband's/wife's educational attainment is about the same as wife's/husband's at the time of 
marriage (homogamous marriage: k = 2); and (3) husband's/wife's educational attainment is 
lower than that ofthe wife'slhusband's at the time of marriage (downward marriage: k = 3). The 
relations "higher", "lower" and "equal" are based on the c1assification of education with four 
hierarchically structured levels that were introduced above (see the discussion in connection with 
Table 1) 
The covariables used in our longitudinal analysis have been defined as follows: 
(1) Non-monotonie age dependenee of the marriage proeess: On modelling the non-monotomic 
dependence on age of the transition rate of first marriage, the combination of two variables are 
used (see in detail Blossfeld/Huinink (1989) or Blossfeld/Jaenichen (1990)). i marks the index 
of the i -th year since the age of 15: 
Log (Di) = Log(Current Age - 15) 
Log (Ri) = Log(60 - Current Age) 
As a result the exponential model contains the following term: 
ß' ß" (4) exp(log(D) * ßI + log(R) * ßII) = D i * R i 
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(2) Educational attainment level: In order to model the educational attainment in the life course 
of women and men dynamically we use the average number of years, which are necessary to 
attain a certain level of education (see Blossfeld 1985): lower secondary schooling (Hauptschule) 
without vocational training (HOB) = 9 years; intermediate schooling (Mittlere Reife) without 
vocational training (MOB) = 10 years; lower secondary schooling (Hauptschule) with vocational 
training (HMB) = 11 years; intermediate schooling (Mittlere Reife) with vocational training 
(MMB) = 12 years; higher secondary schooling (Abitur) without vocational training (ABI) = 13 
years; higher secondary school qualifications (Abitur) with vocational training (ABlMB) = 15 
years; specialized technical college degree (Fachhochschule) (FHS) = 17 years and university 
degree (UND = 19 years. In our analysis educational attainment is a time-dependent covariable. 
Depending on the educational career, this variable contains the educational qualification level at 
each point in time over the life course. The value changes simultaneously with the achievement 
of new educational attainment levels corresponding to the number of years of education. 
( 3) Interaction 0/ educational attainment with age: These two variables take into account that the 
tendency to marry depends on level of education and age. We therefore inc1ude the following two 
interaction variables in our models to control this effect: <Log (Current Age - 15) * Education 
(dynamical) und Log (60 - Current Age) * Education (dynamical). 
(4) Linear cohort trend: Due to the expansion of higher education in the past four decades, the 
level of educational attainment has increased considerably. Younger birth cohorts show less 
differences in gender specific educationallevels. The structural impact of this development is the 
increasing opportunity for the members of younger generations to marry homogamously. To 
control the decreasing difference in the marginal distribution, we inc1ude the linear cohort effect 
as an indicator variable, which assigns to each five-years-cohort a value of 1 (oldest cohort) to 
11 (youngest cohort). 
(5) Duration in school: In the educational system, pupils and students undergo a stepwise process 
of selection. The longer the time that they spend in the educational system, the more homogamous 
the surrounding population will be with respect to the educationallevel. This process is modelIed 
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by the time dependent variable Time in Education. At the age of 15 the value of this variable 
starts with 0 and increases continuously for each year spent in the educational system by 1 until 
leaving the school system. After the educational system is left, the value of the variable is set to 
0, because the individuals are no longer part of the educationally homogeneous networks. 
(6) Not in Schoo!: With regard to our theoretical explanations, juveniles and young adults will not 
be "willing" to marry as long as they remain in the educational system. They will postpone 
marriage until they leave school. This process of postponing and catching up is modelIed by two 
different covariables: (1) the time dependent dummy variable Not in Schoo! (1I0-coding: refe-
rence category: In School ), given the value "1", if a man or a woman has left the educational 
system, otherwise "0"; and (2) a set of seven time-dependent dummy variables, which assign 
smaller time intervals after leaving the educational system to "1" otherwise "0" (reference catego-
ry: In School): 1-2 Years After Schoo!, 3-4 Years After Schoo!, ... , 11-12 Years After Schoo!, >12 
Years After Schoo!. This way it is possible to control for any kind of time dependent tendency to 
marry (e.g. smaller periods of catching up) after the individuals leave school. 
(7) Duration Since Leaving Schoo!: The more time that has passed since leaving the educational 
system, the more heterogeneous the social networks will be. We included this effect linearly to 
our models by using the variable Duration Since Leaving School. With each year that has passed 
after leaving school, the value of the variable increases by "1". 
(8) Main effect of social origin: father's educational attainment: For modelling the main effect 
of social origin, we use the variable Father' s Education. This variable corresponds to the differen-
tiated classification of education of women and men as we described in section (2). 
(9) Change in main effect of social origin: To describe the changes in the effect of social origin 
on spouse selection intergenerationally we included the interaction variable: Father's Education 
* Linear Cohort Trend. 
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( 10) Indirect effects of sodalorigin: An important aspect in our theoretical explanation of spouse 
selection is the indirect effect of social origin. The relation of educationallevels of father and 
daughter/son effects the tendency to marry homogamously or heterogamously. We controlled this 
effect in our models by a set of three dummy variables. These variables contain the relation 
between father's and daughter's/son's educationallevel corresponding to each point in time: (1) 
father's educationallevel is lower than daughter's/son's; (2) father's educationallevel is equal 
to daughter's/son's; and (3) father's educationallevel is higher than daughter's/son's. For these 
variables we used centered effects. These effects show the difference to a hypothetical COlnlnon 
mean (the sum of all effects of one variable signs 0). 
5. ResuIts 
We begin our longitudinal analysis with adescription of the homogamy rates over the life course. 
We estimated these rates for single men (Figure 1) and women (Figure 2) with different levels 
of educational attainment (unskilled, with vocational training, with university degree). The 
resulting curves represent a simulation based on the coefficients of modell in Tables 2 and 3. 
These curves clearly show that there is no simple general age-specific marriage rate as was 
assumed, for example, in Blossfe1d1Huinink (1989), Blossfeld/Jaenichen (1990) or Blossfeld 
(1995). The curves rather show that there is an interaction between educational attainment level 
and age. These education- and age-specific homogamy rates across the life course take into 
account whether the individual is still in school, when he/she leaves school and with which 
qualification level the individual is leaving the educational system. That is, the education- and 
age-specific homogamy rates are estimated on the basis of the time-dependent covariables Log 
(Current Age - 15, Log (60 - Current Age), Log (Current Age - 15) * Education, Log (60 - Current 
Age) * Education, and Log (Not in School).l0 
In Figure 1, one can see that the process of homogamy for unskilled women begins very early and 
then stretches over a relatively long age span. This implies that women enter the employment 
system at a relatively early age and are consequently (consciously or latently) "prepared to marry" 
10 Models of the age- and education-specific influences were more difficult to estimate for the men than for the 
women. In order to estimate an adequate model, the time-dependent covariable "time after leaving the educational 
system" had to additionally be included in Model 1 in Table 3 in contrast to the model for women in Table 2. 
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at a younger age. In contrast, the inclination of wornen of the same age who rernain in education 
to rnarry hornogarnously is very low. Not until these wornen have also left the educational system 
does their rate ofmarriage suddenly rise. And, rnoreover, the increase is greater the higher the 
wornen's level of qualification; this abrupt rise is partially due to having remained longer in 
education and delayed the decision to marry. In the simulation wornen with vocational training 
leave the educational system at the age of 18, with a university degree at the age of 25. 11 lt can 
clearly be shown that for wornen the inclination to marry homogamously is dependent on educa-
tional attainrnent as weIl as partaking in the educational system. This is particularly true and 
stronger for wornen right after completion of education and even more so for those who gradua-
tedfrom university. 
15 
Figure 1: Educational Hornogarny Rates of Wornen 
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11 In order to estirnate the rate of hornogarny using tirne-dependent covariables, the time of cornpletion of qualifica-
tion rnust of course be given. 
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Figure 2: Educational Homogamy Rates of Men 
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A similar picture emerges for men (Figure 2). In contrast to the women, it is characteristic that 
the inclination to marry homogamously did not significantly differ between the unskilled men who 
left the educational system early and those who continued on. The tendency to marry is relatively 
low for both groups. For unskilled men it is difficult or even impossible to start a family at a 
young age. For one, they are less attractive as spouses because of a low level of education and 
correspondingly low income chances. Secondly, due to their low income, they are sei dom capable 
of overcoming financial hurdles related to starting a family at a young age. But it is true that the 
rate of educational homogamy increases with the level of educational attainment. Above all a 
very strong tendency to educational homogamy is visible for university graduates, especially right 
after leaving school. The steeper course of educational homogamy for women with university 
degrees (Figure 1) compared to men with university degrees (Figure 2) can be partially explained 
by the still existent gender-specific role definitions in society. For male university graduates, a 
phase of establishing a foothold in an occupation is important before marriage; for female uni-
versity graduates, this is less important, so that they tend to marry right after leaving the uni-
versity. 
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The rates of groups with different levels of educational attainment could be considered initial 
indicators of the effect that the institutional structures in education have upon individual's deci-
sions to marry homogamously. The high degree of time dependency in patterns of n1arriage can 
emerge as a result of a specific organizational structure of educational institutions and the related 
interplay of different, partially opposing, time-dependent forces. 
Time-dependent effects of the educational system on marriage patterns 
We now use more direct indicators of these time-dependent forces of the educational trajectory 
on the process of assortative mating. 
1. The effect of stepwise selection in the educational system. In the theoretical section of this 
paper, we argued that increasingly homogamous populations are created from one educational 
attainment level to the next. Within each generation the less qualified have left the qualification 
process earlier. Therefore, those young women and men who have stayed together longer have 
attained a similar or, perhaps later, a higher level of education. The structural possibilities of 
developing a relationship with a similar or (later) higher qualified partner, and then possibly to 
marry that person, should therefore increase the Ion ger the time spent in education. In models 2 
and 3 of Tables 2 and 3, this process has been modelIed by taking the covariable "Duration in 
School" into account. It is shown that this covariable for women and men has the expected 
significant positive effect on homogamy and upward marriage, whereas its effect on downward 
marriage is not significant. Thus, the more time women and men spend in the educational system, 
the greater the chance of marrying a partner with similar or (later) higher qualifications. 
2. Participation in the educational system and postponement of marriage. A second hypothesis 
put forth was that attending school or university or the completion of vocational training brings 
on a high degree of dep enden cy upon parents or the state. Students often consider themselves still 
"not prepared" to raise a family. The completion of education therefore represents an important 
step in the status passage into adulthood and is in this sense interpreted as a requirement for entry 
into marriage. Model 2 in Tables 2 and 3 shows that the covariable "Not in School" has the 
expected effect. The inclination to marry for men and women clearly rises after completion of 
education with respect to homogamous and upward marriages. 
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TabIe 2: Transition Rate Models for Upward, Downward and Hornogarnous Marriages With Regard to Educational Attainrnent Level of Wornen 
Variable Upward Marriage Homogamous Marriage Downward Marriage 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Modell Model 2 Model 3 Modell Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -55.28** -50.89** -42.73** -41.92** -48.99** -32.86** -50.81 ** -39.81 * -52.03** 
Log(Current Age - 15) -0.33 0.06 0.24 4.12** 3.43** 3.89** l.91 * 2.11 * l.69 
Log(60 - Current Age) 15.95** 13.67** 11.38** 7.54** 8.95** 4.l1 ** 9.52** 7.46 11.16 
Log(current age - 15) * Education 0.38** 0.32** 0.28** -0.19** -0.13** -0.23** 0.02 0.02 0.11 
Log(60 - current age) * Education -0.36** -0.29** -0.27** 0.14** 0.07** 0.14** 0.09 0.07 0.01 ~ 
Not in School 1) 0.39 2.66** 1.95** 3.85** 2.59** 0.55 ~ 
Duration in School 2) 0.28** 0.28** 0.30** 0.32** -0.28 -0.29 g: 
Duration Since Leaving School 3) -0.02 0.03 -0.09 ;:: ('") 
I - 2 Years After School 4) 2.48** 3.74** 0.53 ~ ..... 
-. 
3 - 4 Years After School 4) 2.58** 4.24** -0.22 C) ~ 
5 - 6 Years After School 4) 2.56** 4.45** -0.45 ~ 
'"-
7 - 8 Years After School 4) 2.48** 4.38** -0.02 ~ 
9 -10 Years After School 4) 2.36** 4.11 ** -0.03 ~ ..... ~ 
N 11-12 Years After School 4) 2.33** 3.93** -1.07 ~ 
\0 More than 12 Years After Schoo1 4) 1.74 * 3.73** -0.72 ~ ~ 
Father' s Education -0.09 -0.10 0.17** 0.15** -0.12 -0.10 ~ 
Father' s Education * Linear Cohort Trend -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 0.08 0.05 ~ Father' s Edu < Daughter' s Edu 5) -0.32** -0.33** 0.37** 0.32** 0.76 * 0.81 * "": 
Father's Edu = Daughter's Edu 5) -0.37** -0.37** 0.39** 0.39** 1.03 * 1.03 * 
"": E' 
Father' s Edu > Daughter' s Edu 5) 0.69** 0.70** -0.76** -0.71 ** -1.79 * -1.84 * ~ ~ 
LInear Cohort Trend 1.59 1.58 3.28** 3.13** -0.83 -0.49 ~ 
Number of Events 727 727 727 1250 1250 1250 105 105 105 
~ 
~ 
..... 
Subepisodes 48681 48681 48681 48681 48681 48681 48681 48681 48681 
Likelihood Ratio Test (LR) 6) 2699.28 3127.86 3199.32 2699.28 3127.86 3199.32 2699.28 3127.86 3199.32 
Degrees of Freedom 5 13 18 5 13 18 5 13 18 
1) Reference Category: In Schoo!. 2) Measured in Numbers of School Years After Age 14. 3) Measured in Number of Years After Leaving Schoo!. 
4) Dummy Variable (Reference Category: In School). 5) Centered Effects. 6) LR = 2*(LogLikelihood(Model wHh covariables) - (LogLikelihood(Model without covariables». 
** p ~ .01 
P ~ .05 
Source: Socio-Economic Panel, Waves 1984-94 
Table 3: Transition Rate Models for Upward, Downward and Homogamous Marriages With Regard to Educational Attainment Level of Men 
Variable Upward Marriage Homogamous Marriage Downward Marriage 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Modell Model 2 Model 3 Modell Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -29.09** -22.48** -34.03** -34.85** -39.88** -36.04** -40.06** -35.91** -29.17** 
Log(Current Age - 15) 1.24 l.02 0.71 4.11 ** 3.64** 3.94** 2.46** 2.56** 2.75** 
Log(60 - Current Age) 9.09** 5.98** 9.17** 6.73** 7.65** 6.21 ** 7.65** 6.95** 4.72** 
Log(Current Age - 15) * Educahon 0.39** 0.29** 0.35** -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 * 0.05 0.04 -0.02 
Log( 60 - Current Age) * Education -0.49** -0.31 ** -0.33** -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 * 
Not in School 1) 
-0.12 2.58** 0.97** 1.88** 1.99** 1.61 
Duration in School 2) 0.27** 0.28"'* 0.11 * 0.13** -0.01 0.02 ;;i 
Durahon Since Leaving School 3) 
~ 
-0.26** -0.19** -0.08** -0.03 0.01 -0.02 ~ 1 - 2 Years After School 4 ) -6.80 1.43** 1.68 ;;:: 
3 - 4 Years After School 4) 2.00 1.88** 1.62 (J ~ 
5 - 6 Years After School 4) 1.93 2.04** 1.96 * ...... 6" 
7 - 8 Years After School 4) 1.45 2.02** 2.06 * ~ ~ 
9 -10 Years After School 4) 1.19 1.81** 1.84 ...... 
. V') 
11-12 Years After School 4) 1.03 1.62** 1.93 '< ~ 
More than 12 Years After School 4) -0.05 1.31** 1.34 ...... ~ 
Father' s Education -0.29 -0.29 0.16** 0.15** -0.09 -0.10 ~ VJ ~ 0 Father' s Education * Linear Cohort Trend 0.02 0.02 -0.18 * -0.18 * 0.06 0.08 ~ 
Father's Edu < Son's Edu 5) -0.76** -0.76** 0.28** 0.25** 0.17 * 0.13 * ~ 
Father' s Edu == Son' s Edu 5) -0.51 ** -0.52** 0.11** 0.10** 0.42 * 0.41 * ~ 
Father's Edu > Son's Edu 5) 1.27** 1.28** -0.39** -0.35** -0.59 * -0.54 * ': ': 
Linear Cohort Trend -0.48 0.47 2.77** 2.70** -2.52 * -2.71 * ~" OQ 
~ 
Number of Events 105 105 105 1250 1250 1250 727 727 727 ~ 
Subepisodes 48637 48637 48637 48637 48637 48637 48637 48637 48637 *' Likelihood Ratio Test (LR) 6) 2446.32 2675.94 2749.76 2446.32 2675.94 2749.76 ~ 2446.32 2675.94 2749.76 ...... 
Degrees of Freedorn 6 13 18 6 13 18 6 13 18 
1) Reference Category: In School. 1) Measured in Numbers of School Years After Age 14. 3) Measured in Number of Years After Leaving School. 
4) Dummy Variable ( Reference Category: In School). 5) Centered Effects. 6) LR == 2*(LogLikelihood(Model with covanables) - (LogLikelihood(Model without covanables». 
p :; .01 
p:; .05 
Source: Socio-Economic Panel, Waves 1984-94 
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3. Leaving the educational system and entering into more heterogeneous environments. Our third 
hypothesis concerning the educational system was that men and women enter more heterogeneous 
environments upon leaving school. Thus, it seems plausible to assurne that the tendency of 
educational homogamy falls and the tendency of educational heterogamy increases the longer 
a person has been out of schoo!. Model 2 in Table 2 shows that this linear connection does not 
hold true for women; and for men this linear connection can only be observed in Model 2 of 
Table 3 for upward marriages. The reason for this result could be due to the fact that the connec-
tion between homogamy tendency and time duration after leaving school is not linear but has the 
form of a parabolic curve, as there is not only a postponement but also a catching up process (see 
Figures 1 and 2). 
4. Educational participation and catching up effects in marriage decisions. Because students in 
the educational system (especially those at a higher level in education) increasingly postpone 
family formation in school, they often catch up after leaving school and enter into marriage 
fast, with those partners that they entered relationships with while they were still in school. In 
other words, after leaving the educational system, the tendency to marry homogamously should 
first increase because those relationships that were formed in school gradually will be turned into 
marriages, and only afterwards does the tendency to marry homogamously start to decrease due 
to the increasing influence of educationally heterogeneous environments. We therefore use use 
in Model 3 a sequence of time-related dummy variables describing this non-monotonie pattern 
in a flexible way. The coefficients in Model 3 for the seven time-dependent dummy variables 1-2 
Years After School, ... ,11-12 Years After School, > More than 12 Years After School show that 
the tendency to be homogamous for men and women right after exiting from education really does 
strongly increase and then decreases afterwards (Tables 2 and 3). These non-monotonie relations-
hips also seem to portray the tendency of women to marry upwards. Here, we first observe a 
strong increase and then a fall the longer that women have been out of school. For downward 
marriages, we cannot ascertain any sort of postponement and catching up effect. 
5. Educational homogamy and educational heterogamy across generations. We now consider the 
development of marriage patterns of cohorts. From Table 1, we know that the tendency of cohorts 
to be homogamous has continually been increasing. With this in mind, we now pose the following 
question: 1s this just the result of the changes in educational participation in the life course from 
cohort to cohort and therefore an effect of changed opportunities for contact to similarly and 
higher qualified people? Or is a purely structural effect also present because the educational 
distribution of men and women has become increasingly similar, so that structurally there must 
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be more homogamous marriages? To ans wer these questions, we have added the covariable 
Linear Cohort Trend to the model. It can be seen in Model 3 that the coefficients of this co-
variable are positive and highly significant for homogamous marriage for both men and wornen 
(Tables 2 and 3). Thus, educational homogamy is partly structurally produced by a change in sex-
specijic differences. The same is true for the tendency of men to marry downwards. The co-
variable Linear Cohort Trend has a significant negative effect for men who marry downwards 
(Table 3). 
Effects of social origin and their changes 
Direct effects of social origin and their changes. 12 In the theoretical part of this paper we argued 
that the direct effect of sodalorigin on educational homogamy should increase with the educa-
tional level of the father. This should be the case because social origin is a conglomerate of 
various highly correlated characteristics, such as wealth, income, prestige, etc., which are positi-
vely correlated with education and make variations between different educational groups not only 
more socially relevant but also reinforce the barriers between social groups. In Tables 2 and 3 it 
is shown that that hypothesis seems true. There is a significant positive effect of the father' s 
educational attainment level on the tendency to marry homogamously for both women and men. 
Thus, social groups will be closed more and more with increasing social origin. 
Has the direct effect of sodalorigin changed in the course of modernization? In the theoretical 
part of our paper, we had to leave this question open due to its dependency on two contrary 
tendencies whose result only can be empirically determined. On the one hand, with respect to the 
effect of class-specijic educational opportunities not much has changed as a result of educational 
expansion (ShavitlBlossfeld 1993) so that the relationship between social groups in the educa-
tional system has hardly been touched. But on the other hand, the absolute number of children 
from lower social classes has increased due to the expansion of the educational system itself. 
More children have been able to reach a higher level of education. Therefore, the possibilities of 
12 In examining the effects of social origin, we experimented with the socioeconomic status and educational level 
of the father. We found that the effect of the socioeconomic status of the father disappears when his educationallevel 
is considered in the analysis. Because both indicators of social origin are highly correlated and capture the influence 
of social origin, we only examined father's educationallevel as an indicator for social origin. 
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coming into contact and entering relationships with children from different social classes have 
increased through educational expansion and this could have decreased the direct effect ofsocial 
origin. In order to test this effect, we included the interaction variable Father's Education * 
Linear Cohort Trend to the models. The coefficients of this interaction variable in Models 2 and 
3 are not significant for all wornen (Table 2). This means that the direct effect of sodalorigin has 
remained relatively unchanged for women across generations but it has decreased signijicantly 
for men (Models 2 and 3 in Table 3). For men, educational expansion seems to have an equalizing 
effect. 
Indirect effects of social origin. As a last step, we discuss the indirect effects of social origin 
resulting from sons' and daughters' educational career. These influences are modelIed by three 
time-dependent dummy variables (Father's Education < Son's/Daughter's Education; Father's 
Education = Son's/Daughter's Education; Father's Education > Son's/Daughter's Education; 
the current highest educationallevel ofthe sonldaughter is compared to hislher father's). To make 
interpretation easier, centered effects have been employed, meaning that the effects represent the 
individual differences to a general mean (the sum of the effects for the three variables is zero). 
In the theoretical part of the paper, we initally assumed that the probability of a sonldaughter 
marrying an equally qualified partner is especially high if the daughter/son have the same educa-
tional level as the father. This is because the social networks of the family of origin and the 
networks mediated through the educational system complement and strengthen each other. 
Models 2 and 3 of Tables 2 and 3 show that we find this effect for homogamous marriages. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables Father's Education = Daughter's/Son 's Education are 
positive and highly significant. 
Additionally, we formulated in the theoretical part of the paper the hypothesis that those sons and 
daughters who are educationally upwardly mobile establish new social interests through school. 
Because these individuals not only prefer finding a partner with the same educationallevel but 
also want to secure their new social status, there is a high probability that they will marry homo-
gamously with regard to education. Models 2 and 3 of Tables 2 and 3 reflect this argument. The 
coefficients ofthe dummy variables Father's Education <Daughter's/Son's Education are with 
respect to homogamous marriages both postive and highly significant. 
Concerning upwardly mobile men and women, who achieve a level of education higher than that 
of social origin, we assurne that they will continue to stay in contact with the people with whom 
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they grew up with (friends, acquaintances, relatives, etc.) for a considerable period of time. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that these men and women will meet a person from their social origin 
and marry downwards. Models 2 and 3 of Tables 2 and 3 support this hypothesis for downward 
marriage. The coefficients of the dummy variables Father's Education < Daughter's/Son's 
Education have a significant positive effect on the downward marriage. 
We also assumed that downwardly mobile n1en and women, who achieve a level of education 
lower than that found in social origin, will show less of a tendency to marry an educationally 
homogamous partner. Models 2 and 3 of Tables 2 and 3 are in accordance with this hypothesis 
concerning homogamous marriage. The coefficients of the dummy variables F athe r' s Education 
> Son's/Daughter's Education have a significant negative effect on the homogamous marriage. 
On the other hand, men and women with lower educational attainment than found in their social 
origin, also have the opportunity to meet a better educated person of the opposite sex through 
their social network of the family of origin and can therefore marry upward (see Models 2 and 
3 of Tables 2 and 3). The coefficients of the dummy variables Father's Education > 
Son 's/Daughter's Education have a significant positive effect on downward marriage. This 
pattern is more pronounced for women than for men. 
Finally, we formulated the hypothesis that in a purely structural sense it is quite unlikely that with 
reference to educational attainment upwardly or downwardly mobile men and women will marry 
upwards or downwards, as it is not possible for them to gain from their social network of the 
family of social origin or from the social network that they acquired via the educational system. 
Models 2 and 3 of Tables 2 and 3 also show that this hypothesis is true. The coefficients of the 
dummy variables Father's Education < Daughter's/Son 's education (Father's Education > 
Daughter's/Son 's Education) have a significant negative effect on upward and downward marria-
ge. 
In summary, we would like to stress two points: 1) Sons and daughters who have exceeded (not 
attained) the educationallevel of their family of origin show the tendency of countermobility 
through marriage and correct their individual educational success (or educational failure). This 
means that the social inequality of the family of origin does succeed in the end. But there is also 
an opposite tendency. 2) Sons and daughters who have climbed upwards due to individual effort 
want to consolidate their position by marrying an educationally homogamous member of the 
opposite sex. These young people are the winners of educational expansion. Change in this 
34 
The Educational System as a Marriage Market 
proportion across generations is therefore an important indicator for the degree of openness or 
exclusiveness of intergenerational inequality structures. For daughters, the proportion has in-
creased from 6% (1919-1933 cohort) to 14% (1949-1963 cohort) and for sons from 9.2% (1919-
1933 co hort) to 13.5% (1949-1963 cohort). In other words, the effect of educational expansion 
seerns to have been very weak in opening social circles and loosening rnarriage patterns. 13 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of the educational system and educational 
expansion on marriage patterns in West Germany. We carried out our analysis by reconstructing 
the rnarriage process of single German men and wornen; we then cornpared the rnalTiage patterns 
of successive birth cohorts over the past 50 years. 
Gur description of the development of educational homogamy across birth cohorts has firstly 
shown a strong long-term trend towards more educational homogamy. This trend is, on the one 
hand, "structural" due to an increasing equality of educational opportunities of men and women 
across cohorts and, in part, a consequence of social networks that are structured by educational 
institutions. Second, the proportion of traditionally upward marrying wornen has sharply decrea-
sed across birth cohorts although it is still quite popular arnongst the youngest cohorts, rnaking 
up one-fifth of all marriages. Finally, it has been shown that there has always been a srnall percen-
tage of rnen and women who have not rnalTied in accordance with the traditional pattern. These 
wornen rnarried less qualified rnen (or these men malTied better educated women). It was quite 
surprising that the probability of younger women to rnarry a less qualified man has not increased, 
though in comparison to men, younger wornen have profited from educational expansion far 
more. 
Increasing educational homogamy across cohorts does not support the idea of a general, long-term 
trend leading to individualization in the course of the rnodernization process (Beck 1986; Hradil 
1987). Instead, the development of educational hornogarny across cohorts demonstrates an 
increasing closure 01 social structure and social networks (see Teckenberg 1991). Higher or 
13 For a detailed description of educationallevel of marriage partners in correlation with social origins, see Blossfeld 
and Timm (1997). The confines of this paper do not permit us to el aborte here. 
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lower educated men and women pool their good and bad sociocultural and economic resources. 
Of course, for modemization and individualization theorists, such results present a problem that 
is very difficult to explain. It is our view that the wrong prediction of empirical development by 
these social scientists is mainly a result of their assumption that social macro-developments can 
only be explained by abstract developmental logics and do not take the changing structural 
conditions for action as weIl as individual aims, orientations and expectations, that is, the micro-
foundation, into serious consideration (see also Goldthorpe 1996). 
Our micro-/macro longitudinal analysis with respect to choice of partner in the life course shows 
that the educational system has become an increasingly important marriage market, particularly 
for those who are highly qualified. Educational homogamy increases with the duration that a man 
or a woman stays in school. Since the duration of schooling has been increasing from birth cohort 
to birth cohort, a rising educational homogamy has been the result. The tendency to marry an 
educationally homogamous partner is especially pronounced right after leaving school and in-
creases the higher one' s educational level. This is especially the case because higher qualified 
men and women (1) increasingly stay in an educationally homogeneous environment and (2) 
postpone marriage until they finish school. The longer that they are out of the educational system, 
the less likely it is that they will enter an educationally homogamous marriage because they 
increasingly live in an educationally heterogeneous environment. 
Furthermore, our analysis showed that the better situated that parents are, the stronger the direct 
effect of social origin on educational homogamy, as social circles become more exc1usive in 
higher social c1asses. The direct effect of social origin remained quite constant for women across 
cohorts, but we noticed a slight decrease in this effect for men. 
Some indirect effects of social origin deserve special mention. Those sons and daughters who 
exceeded the educationallevel of their family of origin (or failed to attain this level) showed a 
tendency of countermobility through marriage, which in part corrected individual educational 
success or failure. However, there is also a smalI, but slowly increasing proportion of sons and 
daughters who have managed to move up intergenerationally through individual efforts and have 
been able to consolidate that level by marrying homogamously with regard to education. 
In summary, our empirical results for West Germany do not show that there is a greater openness 
of social groups through marriage within the course of modernization and individualization 
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proeess. On the eontrary, educational homogamy has strongly inereased aeross eohorts and sodal 
strueture and soeial eireles seem to be more elosed than ever. 
It is interesting to note that most young men and women are probably not aware of the effect of 
opportunity struetures provided by the edueational system and the effeet of social origin on 
marriage decisions. If you ask men about their ideal partner, they mostly answer that she should 
have blond hair and blue eyes, smoke (or be a non-smoker); if you ask women about their ideal 
man, they usually say that he should have blaek hair, be over 1.80 m, smoke (or be a non-smoker) 
ete. This means that the intragenerational and intergenerational reproduetion of social inequality 
subeonseiously prevails though ineonspieuously. We therefore must question the sociologieal 
value of empirie al studies that only colleet data on individual preferenees. 
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Appendix: 
Cohorts 
Classification 
Wives 
(1900 - 1918) 
1919 - 1923 
1924 - ]928 
1929-1933 
1934 - 1938 
1939 -, 1943 
1944 - 1948 
1949 - 1953 
1954 - 1958 
1959 - ]963 
(1964- 1978) 
Husbands 
(1 900 - ] 918) 
1919 - 1923 
1924 - 1928 
1929 - 1933 
1934 - 1938 
1939 - 1943 
1944 - ]948 
1949 - 1953 
1954 - 1958 
1959 - 1963 
(1964 - 1978) 
The Educational System as a Marriage Market 
Distribution of Upward, Downward and Homogamous Marriages With Regard to 
Educational Attainment Level for Birth Cohorts and Different Educational 
Classifications 
Upward Marr'iage Homogamous Marriage Downward Maniagc 
2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4 
% % % % % % % % % % % (1'0 
48,4 48,4 .54,6 56,7 50,3 49,7 42,7 38,9 1,3 1,9 2,6 4,5 
.52,1 52,2 55,4 55,4 43,9 43,9 40,8 38,2 4,0 3,8 3,8 6,4 
46,7 46,8 50,7 54,7 49,3 48,7 44,3 38,9 4,0 4,4 4,9 6,4 
54,4 54,8 57,5 61,8 40,8 40,4 37,3 31,6 4,8 4,8 5,3 6,6 
37,8 38,2 42,1 45,2 56,0 55,2 50,6 42,5 6,2 6,6 7,3 12,4 
36,9 36,9 41,3 42,5 58,1 57,8 53,4 48,1 5,0 5,3 5,3 9,4 
26,7 27,1 31,4 36,5 65,5 64,7 60,4 48,2 7,8 8,2 8,2 15,3 
27,0 27,0 35,8 38,6 68,8 68,8 55,8 47,0 4,2 4,2 8,4 14,4 
23,9 23,9 30,1 32,5 70,6 69,9 60,6 47,1 5,5 6,2 9,3 20,4 
21,6 22,2 30,6 29,9 70,0 68,3 54,6 50,4 8,4 9,5 14,8 19,7 
22,3 22,8 29,8 28,7 69,9 68,5 56,4 42,9 7,8 8,7 13,8 28,4 
1,9 2,2 2,6 4,8 51,7 51,3 45,7 41,3 46,5 46,5 51,7 53,9 
5,8 6,5 6,5 7,8 44,8 44,2 38,9 34,4 49,4 49,4 54,6 57,8 
4,6 4,6 5,0 6,9 42,5 42,0 39,7 34,7 52,9 53,4 55,3 58,5 
5,9 6,3 6,3 8,9 45,6 44,7 41,8 35,4 48,5 48,9 51,9 55,7 
5,8 6,2 6,8 12,7 57,5 57,1 52,9 45,5 36,7 36,7 40,3 41,9 
5,1 5,1 5,4 12,1 61,6 61,3 57,1 46,7 33,3 33,7 37,5 41,3 
5,4 5,8 8,3 ]4,9 66,8 66,4 57,3 45,2 27,8 27,8 34,4 39,8 
6,3 7,1 9,4 16,2 70,7 69,9 60,5 50,8 23,0 22,9 30,1 33,1 
3,8 4,4 9,5 ]7,4 73,7 73,0 59,0 52,2 22,5 22,5 31,4 30,4 
7,7 8,5 15,4 24,6 7],5 70,4 56,5 46,9 20,8 21,2 28,1 28,5 
13,4 ] 3,4 17,1 31,7 65,2 64,0 50,6 40,2 21,3 22,6 32,3 28,1 
I = Educational c1assification used in the current analysis (see Table 1). 
2 = Additional differentiation between lower secondary school qualification (Hauptschule) without vocational 
training and intermediate school qualification (Mittlere Reife) without vocational training. 
3 = Additional differentiation between higher secondary school qualtfication (Abitur) without and witlz vocational 
training and lmver secondary school qualification (Hauptschule) and intermediate school qualification (Mittlere 
Reife) with vocational training. 
4 = Additional differentiation between intermediate school qualification (Mittlere Reife) with vocational training and 
lzigher secondary sc/wal qualijication (Abitur) witlzout (md with vocational training and lower secondarv school 
qualification (Jlauptschule) witlz vocatio/lal training 
Source: Socio-Economic Panel, Waves 1984-94 
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